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Abstract 
Past studies unanimously confirm that establishments with high shares 
of women workers are much more likely to adopt piece rate schemes. 
This resu1t fo110ws the presurnption that women are poor1y motivated by 
deferred cornpensation because of their shorter expected tenure. An 
original survey of establishments provides the first test of the 
deterrninants of piece rates in Hong Kong. Unique survey questions 
identify the presence of deferred compensation for which the share of 
于\\';.1.
women was presumab1y a proxy. Despite these controls and their 
significance , the share of women ful1y retains its ro1e. We suggest 
an a1ternatives to the received theory behind the association between 
wornen and piece rates. 
2 
工 Introduction
The "new economics of p e rsonne l" brought renewed interest in the 
decision by firm s to adopt piece rate payment scheme s . 1 The se schemes 
indiv idualize wo rke r rewards by making earnings proportiona1 to 
results. Wh i1e the v ast major i ty of the n e w literature has been 
theoretical , empíríca1 studíes ín a varíety of countries confirm many 
of th e centra1 theoretica1 predíctions ab out t h e inf1uence of piece 
rates and about t he ir d e te r mi nants. One of the strongest ernpirical 
relationships d emonst ra tes tha t二 es tablishrnent s with high shares -D--f 
women employees are more like1y to use piece r~te 丘巳h旦旦es (see Goldin 
1986 , Brown 19 90 , Drag o and He ywo o d 1995 and Heywood , Siebert and Wei 
1996) . 
l行1i1e e ach study c onfirms this re1ationship , they a1so present 
the identica1 e xp1 a n a tion . Fo11owíng Go1dí n (1986) , women have 
shorter e xpecte d tenure and , as a consequence , cannot be we11 
i ~ .\~ \ . \ 
motiv ated by d e fer r e d comp e nsati on schemes of the 50 r t explored by 
Lazear ( 1979 , 19 83) . He nc e , women will be l a rgely ab s ent in those 
fi rm s that de fer comp ensa t i on. As de f er ring comp e nsatio n efficiently 
motiv a t e s on l y l ong te r m worke rs , firms with hi gh share s of women must 
adop t t he al t ern a t i ve short t erm mo t i v ational scheme of piece rates . 
Accor d í n g t o Go l din ， 平J orne n ar e " n a tura l 1y" s o rted in七 o piece rates 
schemes a s they are n o t in t eres ted in pay ing t he n e a r terrn costs of 
de f er r ed c omp ensat i o n . Th us , p r e v io u s e rnp iri c al s tud i e s use the 
preva l enc e of wo me n workers a s a proxy to identify the absence of 
de ferr e d c ompensat i on . 
Us ing a u n i que s u r vey of Hong Kon g estab1is hments , the 
d e te rm ina nt s of pie ce r a t e adop t ion are e stima te d. Th e d e terminants 
3 
of piece rate schemes in Hong Kong are compared with those from other 
economles. In addition to the preva1ence of women , the survey 
contains measures specifica11y designed to direct1y capture the 
presence or absence of deferred compensation.τhese measures confirm 
that deferred compensation and piece rates are a1ternative 
motivational schemes and that t.he presence of deferred compensation 
makes piece rate use 1ess 1ike1y. Despite the strong ro1e of these 
measures of deferred compensation , the prevalence of WDmen continues 
to be an important determinant of adopting piece rate schemes. 
We suggest this continued importance implies that the prevalence 
of women indicates something beyond the absence of deferred 
compensatlon. Patterns of historica1 segregation rnay have arisen 
because of the dìfference betT,oJ een production in which an individual' s 
production is countab1e and those in which it is not count二ab1e due to 
team production. We argue that team production imposes a greater cost 
for those with 10wer 1abor market attachment . Thus , women wi th 
historica11y 10we 工 1abor market attachment are 1ess like1y to be 
observed in team production and more like1y to be subject to piece 
rates. 
Correctly identifying the determinant.s of piece rate adoption 
ranks as a n important research topic. Petersen (1992) demonstrates 
that variations in piece 主ate use by estab1ishments contribute 
substantially to the distribution of earnings within an occupation. 
Pencave1 (1977) , Seiler (1984) and Lazear (1996) , each confirm that 
piece rate use resu1ts in higher earnings than straight time pay for 
otherwise equa1 workers. The adoption of a piece rates influences 
current earnings and i5 a5sociated with the length of the employment 
relationship and the presence of internal 1abor markets. As Petersen 
4 
(earnings) part of to understand the "in order 100) , pp. (1992 , states 
to first need 、lesystems , payment different by generated inequa1ity 
of forms adopt specific understand the process by which estab1ishments 
our work moves. that understanding that toward ~s 1t remuneration." 
deferred that argurnent the swrunar~zes sect~on next The 
the swrunar~zes also 1t rates. for piece substitute a ~s compensation 
the describes section third The tested. be to hypotheses other 
fourth τhe statistics. descriptive the presents and survey 
results the compares and estimations of serles a detai1s section 
severa1 draws section fina1 The econom工 es.other from those with 
association the of v~ew alternative 
schemes. 
our 
rate 
suggests 
between women and piece 
and conc1usions 
Hypotheses 11. 
schemes incentive rate of piece determinants the grouped have We 
categories We wil1 consider each of these five broad categories. 工τ1to
1n each case we will that of central interest. in turn beginning with 
our ~n available variables the and hypotheses relevant the identify 
survey. 
J扒手{，
企 Substitute 主立主 Deferred 旦旦旦旦ensation
deferred to a1ternative an are schemes rate Piece 
the rearrange firm may a that argues 1983) (1979 , compensation.Lazear 
product than their margina1 1ess profi1e of earnings by paying workers 
than their margina1 product late tenure and paying more in their ear1y 
quasì-rents bui1d to serves S σb n 
.可
ιn r a e Rearranging tenure. their ~n 
This 
thereby 
tenure. 
j ob current 
their comp1ete 
the 10sing 
workers 
of 
5 
cost 
if on1y 
the 
repaid 
lncreases 
are 
rnechanism 
which 
reducing shirkinιand reducing the optimal moní 仁 oring cos ζof the 
firm. For workers who have low expected tenure , the accumulated quasi 
rents are lower and the influence on shirking is smaller. As a 
consequence , the monitoring cost associated with short tenure workers 
remains high suggesting that deferred compensation is less likely. 
τhe logic above implies that the relative benefits of piece 
rates , reduced monitoring and increased output , appear greater for 
short tenure workers paid by regular time rates than for long tenure 
workers subject to deferred compensation. (See Heywood , Siebert and 
Wei 1995 for a theoretical model.) As mentioned , women have shorter 
expec ted tenure and so are less likely to be moti vated by deferred 
compensation and will be more likely subject to pi .e ce rates (Go1din 
l986).2Thus , women should b e so r ted out O f de ferre d compensation 
schemes and into establishments using 
門、 J
C
>
e •L a r e c e .1-D& Indeed , past 
studies proxy the absence of deferred compensation by the presence of 
high shares of female employees and uniform1y find that establishrnents 
with high shares of fema1es are more like1y to adopt piece rate 
pa戶nent schemes. 
The essence of deferred compensation is that the earnings profile 
over a worker' s tenure is steeper than would otherwise be implied 
(Lazear 1979). On1y with this steeper profile can early earnings 
build up quasi-rents that are paid back later. The survey we helped 
create attempts to directly measure the slope of the tenure profile by 
asking establishments to iden七 ify the earnings of otherwise equal 
workers with five years of tenure and with 10 years of tenure. On the 
basis of these answers we compute a rate of pay increase over the five 
year period. 'We follow Lazear and suggest that those firrns with 
1arger percentage increases are more likely to have deferred 
6 
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compensation.' We consciously use the existing workforce to generate 
both earnings measures. The profile across the existing workers seerns 
the best indicator for potential workers of the slope of their 
earnings profile. Moreover , the earnings change measure seerns 
especially compelling as an indicator of deferred compensation in Hong 
Kong where the use of employer provide hea1th insurance and pensions 
are uncommon.τhus ， any deferred compensation is likely to appear in 
the form 0 f earninι5 late in the worker' s tenure rather than in 
pensions or increased health insurance use in old age. 
We recognize that a steeper profile may a1so be indicative of 
internal labor markets in which workers are promoted within the firm 
over their tenure. Ye 仁 this realization does not change the logic 
for adopting piece rates or the nature of our testing approach. The 
possibi1ity of internal promotion motivates only those workers 
anticipating a long tenure (Addison and Siebert 1991). Thus , wornen 
are presumab1y less likely to be motivated by internal labor rnarkets 
and more likely to be sorted into firms adopting the alternative 
motivational scheme of piece rates. 
In addition to rneasures on the slope of the earnings tenure 
profile , our survey contains two other measures designed to capture 
the use of deferred compensati~、 n. The firms are asked to identify 
whether or not turnover costs for workers are hígh enough to be of 
maj or lmportance Wh en costs are high deferred compensation which 
acts to bind the "'lorker to the firm would be more likely. Thus , we 
anticipate that establishments which indicate the importance of 
turnove r costs would be less likely to use piece rates. In addition 
we know whether or not establishments have had recent layoffs.τhis 
indicates an establishment in which long term employment relations are 
7 
less prevalent and in which deferred compensation is consequently less 
likely. 治~~ ;, ~_ f~ . '~ ~\ 
、kτ 「已
Wh ile two previous studies use an indicator of layoffs , no 
previous studies measure the importance of turnover costs or the slope 
/,\)t , 
of the earnings profile. 工 f a high share of women workers does proxy 
an establishment unlikely to use deferred compensation , these three 
more direct measures shou1d reduce or eliminate the ro1e of the proxy. 
Once the adoption of piece rate .s has been conditioned on the other 
indicators of deferred compensation , the gender composition of the 
establishment shou1d be 1ess influential. 
τhe major alternative to either deferred compensation or piece 
rates is the use of straight time rates with managerial supervision_ to 
insure worker effort. Piece rates act to conserve rnanagerial 
resources by linking effort and reward. Thus , relative to either 
deferred compensation or straight time rates , less supe 工:v is ion should 
be observed in establishments with piece rates.τhis notion received 
strong support from work by Eisenhardt (1988) who found that retail 
firms \-lÌ th formal incenti ve schemes had many fe\時 r super..risors per 
T..,Torker. Our survey does not inc lude a measure of supervisors but we 
do know whether a re 皂ular appraisal is made of each worker. Such an 
appraisal would seem unnecessary when effort and reward are linked and 
we anticipate that those firms with such appraisals will be less 
likely to have piece rates. 5 
Other Determinants 
τhe second set of determinants of piece rate schemes capture 
dimensions of the product market . Following past studies , a series of 
r-
industry dummy variables are included . The variation across 
8 
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industries may beassociated with . the ability to institute a piece 
rate scheme because the product determines whether or not individual 
ou 叭 can b~ identified (仙仰Bro臼O叫wn 199… 
is , introduced as it has 10ng been hypothesized that intense 
cornpetition givesroore incentive to contro1 costs and soto introduce 
incentive pay schernes when possib1e \(McKersie et a1 , 1964). On the 
/ 
other . h~nd ， , firrns with rnarket dorninance rnay have attained this 
position be~ause they contro11ed cost effective1y三 We test for this 
using a variab1e denoting whether or not the estab1ishment has "few" 
cornpetitors. Fo11owing Drago and Heywood (1995)our sarnple inc1udes 
profit rnaximizing firrns that have . pub1ic ownership. τhese firms 
presurnably minirnize labor costs and are subj ect to sarne incentive 
scheme tradeoffs as private firrns. 1n any event they are a small 
share of the . samp1e and we inc1ude a durnmy in the estirnation to 
contro1 for their presence. 
τhe third set of deterrninants are elements 。ι
relations. ') It seerns sensible th叫叫。ns rnay obj ect to 向ce rate 
schemes a~ they prefer the solidarity associated with low wage 
d心e叫分 1ndeed. Brown 心hi1ips (凹的) attribute the decline 
of piece rates in California canneries to stronεopposition by unions. 
Yet l Brown (1990) argues that rnerit pay based on perceptions of effort 
are the rnost arbitrary and this suggests that unions rnay prefer piece 
\ \\ 
rates to rnerit 問 ~To test for these conf1icting effects we include 
whether or not the estab1ishrnent has a recognized union. we note that 
unions ar~no~ very preva1ent in Hong Kong and that they are genera11y 
perce~ved to be weak. 
As a second effect , Levine and Tyson (1990) argue that a 
C09Pξrative inòustria1 relations clirnate is rnore likely to result in 
\ 
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incentive pay schemes. This argument may we11 app1y to piece ratés 
because negotiations over the terms of the scheme wi11 be easier with 
a cooperative climate in which workers perceive that "fairness" can be 
obtained. Only then will workers be convinced that the employer is 
not simply going to lower the piece rate (or change other dimensions 
of the p1an) once workers put forth greater …6 ) we proxy a 
cooperative industria1 re1ations clirnate with an indicator of whether 
or not the estab1ishment has a joint committee for consultation about 
the terms of employment. 
The fourth set of determinants revolve around the nature of 
prod叫on. ) Technical change affec ting j obs or working prac tices 
necessarily causes revision in prices per piece and has been argued to 
rnake 的 rates less likely (B叫叫).) Each revision raises 
questions of fairness and requires absorbing ~he costs of deterrnining 
the new rates. We control for such technica1 change and a1so for 
substantia1 organizational change which rnight generate the sarne 
difficulties. 
In ad心。九pi叫以心y ) is perc山d as rnaking piece rates 
\/ 
less likely. Parsons (1986) argJes that piece rates run the risk of 
encouraging damage . or abuse to valuable and complex rnachinery. 
Indeed , high capital intensity rneans that rnore machinery is entrusted 
to each employee and , under piece rates , rnaintenance rnay suffer (Brown 
19 90 ). J Unfortunate1y I we do not have a direct measure of capital 
inten豆 ity and our on1y proxy is the age of the establishment. The 
pat t ern of industrial development in Hong Kong has been such that this 
rnay capture an e1ement of capita1 intensity . Earlier years saw a 
concentration of 1abox intensive industries which have been 芷ep1aced
b y newer firms with far g(eater capitalintensity. These structural 
10 
• 
shifts in Hong Kong have been particularly pronounced as described by 
Suen (1995). Wh ile many of the labor intensive establishments have 
moved . to China , we suspect that older firms remain more likely to have 
the lower capital intensity associated with their vintage and thus be 
more 1ike1y to use piece rates. 
Large scale production is typica11y perceived as making piece 
rates more 1ikely. ) τhe fixed costs of establishing and administering 
a piece rate scheme are spread over a larger nurnber of workers. 
Indeed , these lower per worker fixed costs have been confirmed by the 
International Labor Office (see Brown and Medoff , 1989). Our 
estimates will include the nurnber of manual employees in the 
establishment to control for this possible inf1uence. In addition , we 
wil1 control for whether or not manual workers represent the largest 
group of workers wi thin the es tablishment. Together these variables 
shou1d capture the notion that piece rates will only be established 
when the resu1ting cost savings are sufficient to cover a substantial 
fixed cost. 
The fina1 maj or set of empirical determ i.nants of piece rate 
schemes 心ωfrom 叫…ing argument identified by L…(1985) ) 
According to the theory , not only do piece rates e1 i.cit additional 
effort from existing workers but they attract more productive workers 
þy providing them above average earnings for above average production. 
Lazear (1996) indicates that when the Safe1ite Glass Corporation 
changed from straight time to piece rates , per worker output increased 
41 percent and that 3j8ths of this increase was due to attracting more 
productive workers. He a1so found that absenteeism decreased 
substantia11y. This is a1so a combination of absenteeis m being more 
expensive under a piece rate scheme and workers with 10wer absenteeism 
11 
being attracted to an environrnent in which lo~ absenteeism is better 
rewarded. 
1n an effort to control for this type of sorting the survey 
identifies establishments particularly sensitive to variations in 
worker productivíty and absenteelsm . τhese establishments should be 
more likely to offer piece rates in order to attract workers with the 
relevant characteristics. Specifically , two variables identify 
whether or not establíshments consider productivity to be among the 
most crucial determinants when hiring and whether or not 
establishments consider absenteeism to be among the most crucial 
determinants when hiring. Wh ile these proxies may not be ideal , past 
estimates of the determinants of piece rates have no controls designed 
to capture sorting and this represents a unique aspect of our study. 
111. The SUlvey and Data Description 
In February of 1996 our survey was mailed to a random sample of 
estab1ishments in Hong Kong. 士he data bank of estab1ishment names and 
addresses is maintained by the Census and Statistics Department and 
was made avai1able to us. The mai1ing had the advantage of a cover 
1etter from the Manpower and Education Branch of the Hong Kong 
government encouraging a11 estab1ishments to respond. By the end of 
March a tota1 of 770 responses had been returned by profit making 
firms for a gross re spons e rate O f about 3l percent.7 See "A Fact 
Finding Study " (1996) for more detai1 on the questionnaire and the 
survey methodology . Use of the critica1 variable , the slope of the 
tenure profile , forced us to e1imiτlate a11 firms 1ess than ten years 
old. This reduced the samp1e to 472 whi1e the sum of a11 missing data 
resu1ted in a fina1 usable samp1e of 173 establishments. 
1 2 
Our dl堅 penden仁 variab1e is whether or not norunanageria1 , 
nonprofessiona1 and nonsa1es workers in the estab1ishment - are 'paid 
according to piece rates. W'e identify these workers as manua1 ~orkers 
and note that they are 1argely comprised of blue co1lar ' and lower' . 
1eve1 service workers. The answer to this questio~ provides a .binary 
dependent variab1e indicating the adoption of a piece rate scheme. It 
is just such a binary variab1e that was used in estimations for 
Australia (Drago and Heywood 1995) and the U.K. (Heywood , Siebert and 
W'ei 1995) . Unfortunately we do not know the share of compensation 
that piece rate payments represent and our re1ative1y sma11 sample 
size does not a110w us to make use of coverage information (See Brown 
1990 who uses such information for the U.S.). 
The means and standard deviations of the main variables . are 
presented in Table 1. A tota1 of 23.9 percent of establishments 
report the use of piece rates for the re1evant workers , a figure very 
similar to the 21 . 3 percent in the U.K. (Heywood , Siebert and W'ei 
1996) .8 The average share of emp10yment by women is 45.4 percent. 
This is divided with a 43.8 percent share in the estab1ishments 
without piece rates and a 50.8 percent share in the , establishments 
with piece rates.τhese figures are a11 the shares of the manual 
workers that are female . The average tenure slope is 36.2 percent 
over the fi ve year period wi th a 1arge standard deviation of 31.0. 
This average implies that each year of tenure between 5 and 10 is 
associated with an annual earnings increase of 6 . 4 percent. This 
figure was calcu1ated from survey questions asking the average pay for 
manual workers wi th 5 and 10 years respec ti vely. The change in pay 
shows substantia1 variation with the standard deviation essentia1ly 
the same size as the mean. A substantial share of the observations 
13 
were close to zero indicating that tenure did not contriþute to 
earn~ngs. 
As the dependent variab1e is either zero or one , we estimatea11 
of our determinant estimations with the probit procedure which fits 
the dependent variable to a cwnulative normal distribution. Wh ile 
this procedure a110ws for the bounded dependent variable , the 
resu1ting coefficients are not easi1y interpreted. However , the 
mul tiplication of the coefficients by z - f(X' ß) (f is the p. d. f) 
al10ws calculation of typica1 slope coefficients (see Maddala 1983 , 
pp. 23). We use these typica1 s10pe measures to present e1asticities 
for the more important variab1es. 
IV. Resu1ts and Internationa1 Comparisons 
We begin by presenting our parsimonious estimation that includes 
a11 of the determinants except those three that capture the presence 
of deferred compensation: the s10pe of the tenure profi1e , the 
importance of turnover costs and the recent use of 1ayoffs. We then 
reestimate the equation adding these indicators. We examine carefully 
the inf1uence of the indicators of deferred cornpensation on the ro1e 
of the variab1e capturing the percent of women . 
τhe first co1urnn in Tab1e 2 presents the parsimonious 
estimations. A variety of the hypotheses are confirmed. Most 
important1y , the data from HongKong confirms those from the United 
State , United Kingdom and Austra1ia by finding that p1ants with a 
1arger share of fema1e manua1 workers are more 1ike1y to have piece 
rate payment schemes.τhe resu1t is statistical1y significant at the 
five percent 1evel and the magnitude is substantia1.τhe e1asticity 
is approximate1y one-ha1f , a va1ue about 3 times that found for the 
14 
U.K. and 2 times that in Australia. 1f this large influence ref1ects 
the absence of deferred compensation in female dominated p1ants , it 
should shrink or vanish once the more ditect measures of deferred 
compensation are inc1uded. 
1n addition , the presence of appraisðl p1ays the expected role. 
Those firms using a regu1ar emp10yee appraisal are much less 1ikely to 
adopt piece rate schemes. The high statistical significance and the 
large e1asticity suggest this is one of the most crucial determinants. 
Plants that adopt piece rates do so to elicit effort in a manner that 
conserves on managerial resources. Once in place , the piece rate acts 
as a " se lf-monitoring" scheme that reduces (but surely not eliminates) 
the need for other managerial oversight.τhis i5 precisely what the 
reduced use of appraisal schemes demonstrates. 
The age of the firm seems to proxy the capital intensity in the 
anticipated manner. The sectora1 shifts in Hong Kong ímply that there 
are virtually no high labor íntensity fírms th a. t have started up 
recently. Any labor intensive fírms are older and it is labor 
intensive firms that are presumed to more like1y to adopt piece rates. 
τhU5 ， the strong partial correlation between t h e age of the fírm and 
use of piece rates appears sensible . Wh i1e the 10gic obviously seems 
reasonab1e , the proxy remains imperfect and it remains possib1e that 
age is p1ay ing an additiona1 role of which we are not aware . 
τhere i s a1 s o modest support for the sorting ro1e. The signs on 
both the i mp o rtance of worker productivity and the importance of 
absence are positiv e with the 1atter significant. To the extent that 
firms a dopting piece rates do so in the knowledge that sorting wí1l 
result , it makes sense that firms sensitive to the s e worker 
characteristics wou1d adopt piece rates. Obviously , this stands as 
15 
mu c h more ob1ique confirmation of sorting than that presented by 
Lazear (1996) yet it is the first such confirmation in across 
estab1ishment studies. Fina11y I it is crucia1 to note that none of 
the other resu1ts are sensitive to these sorting variables. In 
particular neither the role of the prevalence of women nor the 
indicators of deferred compensation change behavior with the sorting 
variab1es removed. 
As anticipated for Hong Kong , unionization makes no difference. 
Indeed , none of the remaining variables (excluding the industry 
dummies) achieve statistical significance. Nonetheless , the 
estirnation in total is high1y significant and does a reasonable job 
explaining the presence of piece rates with a psuedo r-squared (the 
likelihood ratio index) of .255 and the dependent variab1e predicted 
correctly in 83 percent of the cases. Moreover , we emphasize that 
this stands as a baseline to which we will add the other indicators of 
deferred compensa tion. 
nature of the results. 
These inclusions will obviously alter the 
Colwnn two presents the augmented specification which includes 
the three indicators of deferred compensation: the percentage change 
in pay , whether rnanual worker turnover is cos t1y and the use of 
dismissals (layoffs) . Firs t , note that the es tirnation does perforrn 
better than the parsimonious one. The est i.mation in tota1 remains 
h i gh1y significant , the psuedo r-squared increases to .302 and the 
percent of correct observations inc. reases slight1y to 85 percent. 
Second , a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
three additional v ariab1es add nothing to the estimations. 
The three new variables confirm , on balance , that deferred 
compensat i on and piece rates are motivational substitutes in the 
16 
workp1ace. A11 three coefficients are of the expected sign and two of 
the three are statistica11y significant. As the rate of pay increase 
within the firm becomes 1arger , the chance of adopting a piece rate 
scheme dirninishes substantially. Sirnilar1y , when the firm has üsed 
dism i.ssals 、 in the 1ast three years , the use - of a piece rate is rnore 
1ikely. Wh i1e the coefficient of the -turnover cost rneasure does not 
reach . significance , it has the anticipated negative coefficien仁
(worker's can be bonded with deferred cornpensation) and does have a 
t-statistic greater than 1.2. Thus , on balance the direct rneasuresof 
deferred cornpensation perform we11 in the estimation and confirrn the 
wide1y he1d hypothesis that piece rates wi11 be observed where 
deferred compensation is not used. 
The remainder of the resu1ts stand roughly as before. Most 
important1y , this inc1udes the role played by the share of the manua1 
workers who are women. That ro1e rernains virtua1ly identica1 in size 
and. . WQu1d meet an even tougher significance test. Even after 
contro11ing for the direct measures of deferred compensation , plants 
with 1arge shares of women are rnore 1ike1y to adopt piece rates.τhe 
rnagnitudes of these effects are worthy of rnore detai1. 
Table Three presents a variety of projections designed to capture 
the re1ative magnitudes. 1n each case a11 variab1es not identified 
are set to their mean va1ues. The proj ections vary three measures , 
the percent women , the change in pay and the use of dismissa1s. In 
each case the new va1ue of the under1ying vector is passed through the 
curnu1ative norma1 to predict the 1ike1ihood of adopting a piece rate. 
When the change in pay is 65 percent over 5 years (approxirnately one 
standard deviation above its mean) and the p1ant has not used 
dismissa1s , we assume that deferred compensation is 1ikely. 
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S i milarly , when the change in pay is 5 percent over 5 years 
(appro x imately one standard deviation below its mean) and the plant 
has used dismissals , we assume that deferred compensation is un1ik、e1y.
We project the likelihood of piece rates for two levels of the 
prevalence of women: 20 percent and 70 percent.τhese are a1so about 
a standard deviation either side of the mean. 
presents four projections in total. 
Thus ， τable Three 
First , the influence of deferred compensation is substantial 
resu1ting in a six fold increase in the like1ihood of adopting piece 
rates in plants with low shares of women and a1most a four fold 
increase in plants with high shares of women. Second , the magnitude 
of the role of the share of women is striking. When the share is 
high , a p1ant not using deferred compensation is three times more 
like1y to adopt piece rates. When the share is high , a plant using 
deferred compensation remains almost twice as likely to use piece 
rates. Wh ile it remains possib1e that the share of women is simply a 
proxy for deferred compensation , the current results surely make that 
questionable. Including three more direct measures of deferred 
compensation did nothing to alter the role that the share of women 
p1ay. Even after the inclusion of these direct measures it rernains a 
central determinant in the adoption of piece rates. 
Table 4 facilitates a broader cornparison of our results for Hong 
Kong wi th those from other economies. As e mphasized I the share of 
women emplo y ees play s a central role in every economy. Indeed , it 
stands as the only central result confirrned across a11 four economies. 
τwo of the indicators of deferred compensation are unique to the Hong 
Kong survey whi1e the use of dismissa1s (layoffs) was used in both the 
UK and Australia. W'h ile dismissals were not identified as a 
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determinant for Australia , the Hong Kong estimation mirrors that in 
the UK finding that establishments using layoffs are more like1y t。
adopt piece rates. τhe firm age proxy for Hong Kong mirrors the 
result found for the more direct measure of capital intensity in the 
Australia study while the U.K. and U.S. studies found no inf1uence for 
capita1 intensity.τhe finding that firms with appraisal systems are 
1ess likely to use piece rates confirms the inverse re1ationship 
between manageria1 resources and piece rates in the U .K. and he1ps 
isolate the positive relationship in Australia as paradoxica1. The 
absence of an influence for unionization or consul tati ve comrni ttees 
fi ts wi th the balance of resul ts from other econornies. Unions have 
the anticipated negative influence on piece rates on1y in the UK and 
no influence of consultative committees has been confirmed in any 
economy.τhe sorting variables are unique to the Hong Kong study 
while the Hong Kong study had no rneasure of part tirne workers. 
The one rnajor result absent from the Hong Kong estimation is the 
confirmation of firm size as determinant of piece rate payment 
schemes. Wh ile a11 three other studies present such confirrnation , the 
size coefficient in the Hong Kong estirnations was routine1y 
9 insignificant and the sign was negative.; It could be the case that 
other factors work against the traditional size effect. Large firms 
with greater hierarchy and larger internal labor markets are known to 
be more 1ikely to adopt promotion based incentive schernes (see Medoff 
and Abraham , 1980 and Baker , Jensen and Murphy , 1988). This may be 
particularly so in Hong Kong and these competing schemes rnay undercut 
an otherwise evident tendency to use piece rates. 
19 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper expands the set of studies which examine the 
determinants of piece rates. It does 50 in an economy not previou51y 
examined , Hong Kong , and provide5 exp1icit compari5ons with those done 
ín other economíes. It confirms a variety of theoretica1 predictions 
inc1udíng that piece rates are more 1ike1y when manageria1 resources 
are not beíng spent on other mechanisms such as appraísa1 systems. 
The study a1so provides at 1east oblique confírmation of the sorting 
hypothesis. Most fundamenta11y , the study examines the crucial played 
by the share of establishment emp10yees who are women. 
τhe parsimonious estímation confirmed the traditional positive 
relationship between high shaxes of women ernp10yees and the adoption 
of piece rates. Three índicators of deferred compensation were then 
included in the estírnation. Two of these were unique to the Hong Kong 
survey. These new indicators confirmed that when deferred 
compensation was more likely , piece rates were less likely. Yet , 
these new results did not at a11 change the importance of the share of 
women emp10yees as a determinant of piece rate adoption. This seems 
surprising as the on1y rationale consistently advanced for the role of 
the women share has been that women can not be well moti vated by 
deferred compensation. Thus , when women are a large share of the 
e5tablishmen亡 's work force , deferred compensatíon ís less likely and 
50 píece rate adoption is more 1ikely. 
Wh ile the re5ults from our estimatíons do not make this logic 
impossib1e , they do reduce the líkelíhood that ít is the only 
explanation for the strong role played by the 5hare of 
10 
women. Certainly , the 510pe of the tenure earnings profi1e , together 
wíth the other two variables , would seem to more directly capture the 
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presence of deferred compensation. The persistence of the share of 
wornen as a determinant would seern to demand additional explanation. 
τo conclude we suggest three alternative explanations that may p1ay 
sorne role in explaining the continued strength of the share of women 
employees in the face of the alternative indicators of deferred 
compensation. We do not pretend that we can directly test for these 
alternatives but contend they should be part of further surveys and 
ernpirical testing. 
The view of women workers as being characterised by shorter 
expected tenure is obviously correct but incomp1ete. Lower expected 
tenure is on1y one manifestation of 10wer labor force attachment. For 
instance , Corcoran and Duncan (1979) find that women are more likely 
to take time off for their own illness , more like1y to take tíme 
off for the illness of a farnily member , more likely to place 1i血its
(either hours or distance) on the jobs they accept and are more 1ikely 
to qui t in the near future for reasons unre lated to j ob training. 
工ndeed ， these differences are observable not on1y across occupations 
but also within (see Wood , Corcoran and Courant 1993). This broader 
vie\" of lower labor force attachrnent may provide ins ight into the 
concentration of women on piece rate schernes. 
The essence of piece rate schemes is that output of each worker 
is distinct and can be attributed to an individual . Such a production 
process involves a minimum of tearn work (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
When team work charac terises produc tion , i 吐entifying an individual 
contribution is necessari1y difficult. Moreover , when 七eam work 
characterises production , 10w labor force attachrnent imposes a much 
higher cost. For example , when a worker calls in sick at the last 
minute a firm without team production loses just that worker's output 
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bu 仁 a firm with team production risks losing much or all of the outpu仁
of the entire team. 
Those firms with a production process characterized by team w~rk 
will use managerial oversight as a method of monitoring effort. This 
monitoring process rnay involve deferred compensation but need not. 
The process could also include merit pay allocations or sanctions for 
workers who shirk. Whatever the rnonitoring process involves , itwill 
not include piece rates and production will be sensitive to low labor 
force attachment.τhus ， we rnight anticipate a positive relationship 
between the percent wornen workers and piece rate adoption that goes 
beyond the use of deferred compensation. The lower labor force 
attachrnent of women makes thern less - dësirab1e in team production and 
it is only in the absence of team production that piece rates can be 
successful1y used. 
The long history of gender segregation in work tasks rnay feed 
into the differential use of piece rates. Women have traditionally 
worked at home at tasks that do not contain large e1ements of team 
production.τheir rnovement to the labor force in j obs related to 
their tasks at home would further increase the 1ikelihood that they 
would be subj ect to piece rates. As an illustration , the need1e 
trades have a long tradition of piece rate adoption. These tasks are 
simi1ar to those historica11y performed by women at home and are 
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characterized by only modest degrees of team production..~ It seems 
likely that women would be concentrated in needle trades and that 
piece rates would be adopted. This seems likely without any appeal to 
deferred compensation. 
To the extent that societal pressures concentrate women in 
"women' s work " (tasks similar to those traditiona1ly done at home) 
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there may be yet another element driving the strong correlation 
between women and piece rates. A disproportionate share of women are 
segregated into occupatlons characterised by low levels of team 
production and thus particularly suitable for piece rate adoption. 
Thus , one need not assume (although it may be the case) that the 
conc~ntration of women in piece rate schemes is efficient to generate 
a sensib1e theory behind the correlation. 1 t could be societal 
pressure for women to remain in a narrow set of occupations combined 
with the characteristics of production in those occupations which 
generates the correlation. 守。1-y /' I'.J~ ~v 'V ( ".~ \ /\ν 、 v \/
In Short ( ;e suggest that broadening the …… beyond 
deferred compensation stands_ the best chanée of explaining the 
re1ationship between women workers and piece rates. Lower labor force 
attachment more genera1ly argues that women rnay be concentrated in 
occupations with 10w 1eve1s of team production and , hence , a high 
chance of using piece rates. This tendency may be compounded by the 
skills women bring frorn traditional work at home and by societal 
pressures to keep women in these j obs. Certain1y , the resul ts from 
Hong Kong suggest that the association between women and piece rates 
goes beyond deferred compensation. Wh i1e additional research is 
sure1y warranted , the current results do ca1l for a broader focus of 
the sort we suggest. 
There remains an a1 ternati ve explanation for the ro1e of an 
establishment's percent women in predicting use of piece rates. 
Discrimination against women may be particular1y difficu1t when 
earnings are based on an objective measure of performance such as the 
actua1 number of pieces produced . Thus , women may avoid work settings 
in which earnings and prornotion resu1t from a male supervisor's 
23 
subjective evaluatìon of effort and may search for jobs whích directly 
tíe earníngs to an undeniable índicator of pe r. formance. Indeed , 
Be1man and Heywood (1988) found a tendency for blacks in the United 
States to be rnore like1y to be found on piece rates , a result 
consistent with this 1ogic. Obviously , even a piece rate scheme 
leaves some latitude for discrimination such as arguing that piece,s 
don't meet the quality standard. Nonethe1ess , this alternative 
suggests another alternative to the standard notion that women are 
disproportionately found on piece rates because they have shorter 
employment duratíon and aga i.n calls for a broader research agenda. 
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J TABLE ONE Definitions , Means and Standard Deviations 
Piece D山nmy-l if ~ piece rate is used for the payrnent of 
norunanagerial , nonprofessiona1 and nonsa1es workers ("manua1 1t) (.213 
.423) 
主Women Percentage women among manua1 workers (45.4 , 25.5) 
PayChange Percentage increase in earnings for 1irie workers associated 
with the differenceYbetween 5 and 10 years of te~ure (36.3 , 31.0) 
Dismiss Dummy-l if the estab1íshment has had 1ayoffs in the workforce 
during the 1ast 24 months (.312 .463) 
Turnover Dummy=1 if the estab1ishment identifies the turnover costs 
associated with manual workers as important (.254 .437) 
PubFirm Durnrny圓 1 if the estab1ishment is a goverrunent owned for profit 
firm (.012 .107) 
FirmAge The nurnber of years that the firm has been in business (25.4 , 
23.3) 
MPowe r Dummy單1 if the estab1ishment reports that there are on1y a 
"few" competitors in its product 1ine (.341 , .475) 
Union Dummy=l if the estab1ishment recognizes a union (.029 , .168) 
Consult Dummy-l if managers consu1t with employee representatives on 
a regu1ar basis (.382 , .487) 
Size The number of manual workers in the estab1ishment (342.2 , 1022) 
Manual Dummy=1 if manual workers represent the 1argest group of 
workers in the firm (.671 , .471) 
TechChng Dummy=1 if new machinery or equipment has been introduced in 
the last three years (excluding routine rep1acement) (.370 , .484) 
OrgChng Dummy=1 if substantia1 changes in work organization or 
working practices have been introduce in the last three years 
(exc1uding those associated with new machinery or equipment) (.312 , 
.484) 
Appraise Dummy~1 if the company conducts a regu1ar appraisa1 of all 
staff (.734 , .443) 
Productivity Dummy=l if the estab1ishment identifies individua1 
worker productivity as among the most important factors when hiring 
manual workers (.509 , .501) 
Absence Dummy=1 if the estab1ishment identifies individual workers' 
expected absenteeism as among the rnost irnportant factors when hiring 
manua1 workers. (.040 , .198) 
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TABLE TIlO 
Probit Estimations 
without measures of 
deferred compensation 
with measures of 
deferred compensation 
Productivity 
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(.2908) 
-3 . 085 
(59.24) 
-.3379 
(.3093) 
3.038 
(99.99) 
-1.107決*
(.3051)(.792] 
- .0007 
(.0005) 
.5580 
(.4693) 
-.2470 
(.2958) 
.2492 
(.3026) 
.6448 
(.4125) 
1 . 497* 
(.7969) 
-.0123*女
(.0061) [.409] 
-.3980 
(.3279) 
.5113* 
(.2804) (.149] 
Constant 
毛'Women
FirmAge 
MPower 
Union 
Consu1t 
PubFirm 
Appraise 
Size 
Manua1 
TechChng 
OrgChng 
Absence 
PayChnge 
Turnover 
Dismiss 
VJ rste <hd.-4耐心ID 
YES YES 
Chi-squared 47.62 56.51 
Psuedo R-Squared .255 .302 
t a FL d
>Z 
D
‘fk 
Fιs on 
a 
ee um 1,4 at 刊v
.222 .201 
Samp1e Size 173 173 
次 significant at the 10 percent 1evel 
*女significant at the 5 percent leve1 
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TABLE THREE 
Projected Probabi1ities 
Deferred Compensation 
is un1ikely 
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.172 .614 
Note: These projects are rnade using the fu1l sampleand by setting al1 
other variables than 宅Women ， PayChnge and Dismiss to their mean 
values. See the text for detai1s. 
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TABLE FOUR 
Comparisons Across Economies 
USA Australia UK Hong Kong 
%Women + + + + 
PayChange na na na + 
Turnover na na na O 
Dismiss na O + + 
Union O O + O 
Consult na O O O 
Capital Int.* O O 
(Age) 
MPower na O O 
Size + + + O 
TechChng na O + O 
OrgChng na na O O 
Managerial次女 na + 
Resources (Appraisal) 
Productivity na na na O 
Absence na na na + 
Parttime﹒*次次 na na 
Industry yes yes yes yes 
Dununies 
可<The UK study the presence of "high technology" to proxy capita1 
lntensity. 
次*The UK and Australia studies both use the share of managers as an 
indicator of manageria1 resources. 
*決*The UK measure was the share working parttime while the Austra1ia 
measure was the percent officially designated as "casua1." 
Note: USA (Brown 1990) I Austra1ia (Drago and Heywood 1995) I UK 
(Heywood , Siebert and Wei 1996). 
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ENDNOTES 
1 ,rh i S new emphas is i S summarized in the J.-9.且主旦旦1. Q主 1.豆h立主 Economics 
(1987) vo1ume dedicated to the subject and in the new text by Lazear 
(1996) . 
2rndeed , in February 1996 , fu11-tirne rnen ernp10yees in Hong Kong had an 
average tenure of 81.2 months wi11 that for fu11-time women employees 
was 54.7 months . These figures are computed from the "Public Survey" 
commissioned by the Education and Manpower Branch of the Hong Kong 
governrnent. 
3 rt is possible that \、lornen even compete harder for piece rate j obs 
knowing that their a1ternative is straight time rate jobs. 
4τhe fi ve year benchmark was chosen to minimize the influence of 
iτ1vestment in ernp10yer specific human capita1 which should have been 
undertaken very ear1y in a worker's tenure. 
5Note that firrns with appraisa1s may include those with deferred 
cornpensation because detection of shirking is sti11 needed even when 
the costs of job 10st are high. 
6See Gibbons (1987) for a mode1 of an employer doing just this. 
70fficia1s of the Census and Statistics Department suggested to us 
that the char acteristics of the respondents aligned we11 with the full 
popu1ation . 
8τhe U . K. figure a1so identifies piece rate use for manual workers 
which , while c1ose , need not be identical with the definition we have 
adopted . 
3 2 
9The variable was alternatively entered as a log and as a dwnmy 
variab1e above a variety of critical 1eve1s. At no time were we 
ab1e to confirrn the expected finding of a significant positive 
re1ationship with piece rate adoption. 
10 Indeed , the sirnp1e corre1ations between the women share of the 
workforce and two significant indicators of deferred compensation are 
exceeding1y low .04 for the change in pay and .03 for dismissals. 
11 Indeed , the entire "putting out system" in which wornen were paid for 
work done at home was both centered on the need1e trades and used 
virtua11y on1y piece rate payments. 
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